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mocked the Carter administration's pathetic efforts to sell the SALT II treaty to the Senate in a witty and provocative article entitled "Rafshoon-ing the Armageddon." I have heard this article mentioned by Dr. Adelman's opponents probably because by its tone it adds insult to the injury suffered by the supporters of the SALT II treaty here in the Senate. So this is one key point in the case against Dr. Adelman. These last 2 days have been a chance to refight the SALT II debate and to appeal for an ACDA Director who will lobby the President on arms control and somehow reverse President Reagan's long-standing view that the SALT II treaty is fatally flawed and that deep reductions in strategic weapons must be sought in negotiations with the Soviet Union instead.

The second key point in the opponents' case against Dr. Adelman seems to be that he lacks the kind of experience in arms control matters that his opponents believe is required for an ACDA Director. No Senator has specified in detail what this great experience should be that Dr. Adelman lacks, but I suspect what his opponents have in mind is that Dr. Adelman did not experience either the selling of the SALT II treaty or the negotiating of this treaty. It is this lack of experience which his opponents are actually lamenting. Many of Dr. Adelman's supporters, however, probably including President Reagan, count Dr. Adelman's nonparticipation in the selling and negotiating of SALT II as one of his highest qualifications to serve as Director of ACDA. Indeed, how could anyone tainted with guilt by association with SALT II successfully serve our President who made it clear in the campaign against President Jimmy Carter that the SALT II treaty was fatally flawed?

What is the evidence for my hunch about the case against Dr. Adelman that his opponents have not dared to state clearly and openly? The names they whisper as possible replacements are those who worked on SALT II during the Nixon and Ford administrations or those who did not publicly and forthrightly oppose the ratification of the SALT II treaty.

This then is the secret hope of Dr. Adelman's opponents. They want us to vote him down and instead find someone whose policy views are to the left of President Reagan. At the least they hope to embarrass the President and feed the minority perception that the President is not serious about arms control.

I must advise Dr. Adelman's opponents as chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution that they would find interesting reading in the Federalist Papers on the subject of why the Senate should give its advice and consent to Presidential appointments. This is a debate we should have another day. And I intend to raise the comments of Dr. Adelman's opponents

on that day, should it ever come, when another President in the distant future, perhaps even a member of the Democratic party, nominates a fanatic zealot for arms control at any price to be his Director of the Arms Control Agency. On that future day, I ask my colleagues should the Senate rise up in opposition and seek to replace that future liberal President's nominee with a hawk who is skeptical about Soviet violations of arms control agreements? On that day, should I live so long, I will read the words of Dr. Adelman's opponents into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and ask them to vote down that future President's nominee, if that is their understanding of our Constitution and the meaning of the Senate's power of confirmation of Presidential appointments.

Mr. President, I will vote enthusiastically today to confirm Dr. Adelman who is an outstanding choice. I might add my personal view that the experience he has suffered these last few weeks at the hands of his critics is not a bad thing but a useful tempering experience that he may look back upon with fondness and relief that he was put to the test by the President's opponents and that he passed the test and earned greater respect, admiration, and sympathy than if he was a mere bland, noncontroversial figure in a field which seems to excite such passion from both liberals and conservatives; namely, the field of arms control and disarmament.

Perhaps there was a time when arms control was an unpleasant subject for conservatives who looked only to America's military might to defend our people, but today conservatives must be interested in and familiar with arms control issues. I commend those Senators who have visited the arms control negotiation that Dr. Adelman will be supervising. I visited the MBFR, INF, START, and CSCE negotiations and believe more conservatives should do so to make plain to the Soviets that the Senate stands behind President Reagan's negotiating offers and will accept nothing less than strict verification of any agreements.

I thank my colleague from Idaho.

Mr. McCURE. Mr. President, I yield myself 8 minutes.

ARMS CONTROL POLICY: WHERE HAVE WE BEEN?
WHERE ARE WE GOING?

Mr. McCURE. Mr. President, arms control has been a major thrust of U.S. foreign and defense policies for 25 years, and a top American priority for the past 10. Unfortunately, notwithstanding a few notable success, the results have been disappointing. The arms control process has not produced stability around the world, better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, enhanced security, or an end in the growth of nuclear arms.

Today, more than ever before, dissatisfaction with arms control is intense. Perhaps because of the past dis-

appointments, there is an increased sense of urgency and pressure to negotiate, to reach agreement, to end the nuclear arms race. This pressure is substantial, coming as it does not only from Congress and the media, but from town meetings as well.

The situation is critical because the problems associated with agreements—systems, definitions, verification, and so forth—are all more difficult than they have been at any time in the past. Pressing for an agreement in 1983, or 1984, is tantamount to asking for more and better accomplishments in 1½ or 2 years than were achieved in 7 years of negotiating SALT II, when the issues were technologically less difficult.

Mr. President, the arms control process is not working, as I will show. And, when business as usual is not working, it is time for change. I believe we need to take a hard look at the past, preserve what is good, and introduce some new ideas—ideas that take into account why the past approach has failed.

Today, as we consider the nomination of Dr. Kenneth Adelman to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it is an especially good time to review this past and suggest some improvements. In reviewing the past, one of the agreements I will bring up is the little known basic principles of relations, which was part of SALT I and SALT II. In this agreement, both sides agreed not to seek to gain unilateral advantage.

But, if there is a common thread to the Soviet approach to arms control, it has been to gain unilateral advantage, beginning with the first arms control initiative, the nuclear test moratorium. As I will discuss, this has also been the case with the Threshold Test Ban, the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement, SALT II, the Geneva Protocol, and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Conventions. Soviet violations and circumventions have destroyed all of the basic objectives we had in entering into these treaties.

Clearly, the horrible consequences associated with today's weapons of war are of such a magnitude that in spite of the past disappointments, we cannot afford to discard the process. But changes are definitely called for. I believe Dr. Adelman has the wisdom to identify and retain the positive aspects and the imagination and courage to identify and put forth new initiatives.

Mr. President, the problem of compliance has to be dealt with as a matter of highest priority. I also would like to remind the Senate of the seven most militarily significant violations and circumventions, to which Dr. Adelman will surely give his intense attention. These seven Soviet violations are:

First, Soviet deployment of heavy ICBM's replacing light ICBM's, en-

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abling them to quintuple their counterforce capability.

Second, Soviet ICBM rapid reload/refire, stockpiling of extra missiles, covert soft launch, and mobile ICBM capability, circumventing all SALT launcher ceilings, and also adding a strategic reserve with strong counterforce capabilities.

Third, Soviet flight-testing of two new type ICBM's, in violation of SALT II, which adds to an already overwhelming counterforce capability.

Fourth, Soviet violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in militarily significant ways, which also adds to their counterforce capability.

Fifth, Soviet development of a nationwide ABM defense, through their construction of ABM battle-management radars, three types of SAM's for ABM mode use, and a mobile or rapidly deployable new ABM in mass production. All of these capabilities give the Soviets a real ABM breakout capability.

Sixth, Soviet violation of the biological warfare and chemical weapons conventions.

Seventh, Soviet deployment of offensive weapons to Cuba, in violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of 1962.

President Reagan himself has accused the Soviets of four of the above arms control violations. The Scowcroft MX Commission report mentioned one, Dr. Henry Kissinger has referred to one as "sharp practice," and the Defense Department has expressed concern over one.

Another requirement in looking toward the future that I will discuss is patience. The rush to seek agreement for immediate political gains has directly contributed to the failure of SALT I and SALT II. Certainly, if there is any quality Dr. Adelman has displayed over the past few months, it is that of patience—and, to his great credit, I might add.

I will also propose several major new initiatives to help deal with the difficult question of verification, and I will strongly support the need to focus much more attention on how wars start, that we may better prevent their occurrence. Dr. Adelman's training in political affairs and his impressive writings prepare him eminently well to lead serious efforts in these areas.

Above all, the arms control process needs leadership and direction on a continuing, day-to-day basis. Someone who is mindful of the past and realistic about the future. I believe that Dr. Adelman fits that bill and should be confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. President, with this brief introduction, I would like to turn now and review the accomplishments of our past arms control efforts with the Soviet Union.

The 1958 nuclear test moratorium can be taken as the first real United States-Soviet arms control agreement. This informal agreement was actually just a succession of unilateral public

statements in which both sides agreed to cease nuclear testing. This moratorium lasted until September 1, 1961, when the Soviets unilaterally resumed atmospheric nuclear testing with the most extensive series of nuclear tests the world has ever experienced, including tests at high altitude and yields in excess of 50 megatons.

In examining this Soviet breakout of the moratorium, three observations are worth making.

First, it is highly probable that the Soviets intended to violate the agreement from the beginning. The tests were too extensive, too well planned, and too great an extension of the prior art to be viewed as a mere Soviet defensive move undertaken in response to French atomic tests in early 1961.

Second, the United States knew in advance that the Soviets were going to resume testing, but did nothing to prepare the United States to respond either with its own test series or with a propaganda barrage. It was not until some time after the Soviet test series was finished that the United States decided to resume atmospheric testing, which it did in April 1962.

The third observation concerns the arms control protest response in the U.S. media. President Kennedy had expected an outpouring of U.S. media protest when the Soviets broke the moratorium and was surprised when only a dribble came forth. The U.S. outcry did not emerge until the United States decided to resume testing the following spring.

The moratorium enabled the Soviets to leapfrog ahead of the United States in the design of high-yield weapons and to gain critical knowledge of weapon effects associated with high altitude explosions. At that time, high-yield designs were important to overcome accuracy deficiencies associated with the attack of hardened targets. Understanding the effects of high altitude nuclear explosions since has been determined to be very significant in designing ballistic missile defenses and in assessing the vulnerability of electronics and the changes in communication propagation paths caused by the high-altitude burst electromagnetic pulse phenomena.

The second United States-Soviet arms control agreement was the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Cuba agreement. On October 27, 1962, Khrushchev proposed "to remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive weapons." In his response, President Kennedy made it quite clear that the weapons not only be removed, but "further introduction be halted." The "weapons" not only referred to bombers and missiles, but troops as well. As had been acknowledged by Khrushchev the previous day, "troops are by Soviet definition offensive weapons." Finally, Kennedy stated that the series of letters should be regarded "as firm undertakings on the part of both our Governments."

While there is some doubt as to whether or not all the Soviet offensive missiles and bombers were actually removed at the time, there is no doubt that since then, Cuba has been transformed into a Soviet military base that is now as significant a danger to the United States as it was about to become in the fall of 1962, perhaps more significant. The offensive military capabilities that have been introduced gradually into Cuba include a combat military brigade that could be specially trained Spetsnaz forces for sabotage, special operations, or nuclear weapons security forces; nuclear submarine docking and supply facilities, expanded air base facilities; and associated basing and operations of reconnaissance and, more importantly, nuclear capable aircraft, namely Mig-23's and TU-95 Bear bombers.

Cuba also has been turned into the main base—or revolutionary center to use Soviet terminology—for training revolutionary forces and exporting these forces and equipment to Central America and throughout the Caribbean. Cuban intelligence, totally a Soviet KGB surrogate, has been identified as active in intelligence operations within the United States and in supplying heroin and other illegal drugs to criminals in the United States.

In the fall of 1963, a formal agreement banning at atmospheric tests, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, was signed and ratified. The objectives were to stop polluting the atmosphere and to put a cap on the development of high-yield designs. Underground testing was permitted provided that no radioactive debris would be allowed to escape into the atmosphere and be carried across national boundaries.

Since the treaty went into effect, the United States has had one case of minor "venting" of debris that was deposited locally and did not pass any national boundaries. In contrast, the Soviet Union has repeatedly vented—30 known times—with sufficient intensity that the radioactive debris was carried beyond the Soviet boundaries. The United States has repeatedly complained, but with no apparent effect.

These are serious incidents, but public statements and discussions have never raised the level of public understanding of the nature of the threat or the extent of the Soviet violations. Our reactions, Soviet disdain, and our almost total failure to pursue the obvious patterns, have nearly rendered the treaty void on one side. While we have adhered to it, they certainly have not.

Throughout the 1960's, the most significant nuclear arms control efforts were unilateral American initiatives. In this time frame, we greatly expanded our nuclear capability with the deployment of 1,000 Minuteman missiles and 41 Polaris submarines with 656 missiles.

But, these deployments should not be allowed to mask the more dominant

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long-range actions that were undertaken in the early 1960's to "put the nuclear genie back in the bottle."

The Minuteman and Polaris deployments were mainly the last vestige of momentum of the nuclear weapons programs of the 1950's. The Minuteman deployment actually was a significant cutback from what had been previously planned and funded. The procurement was to have been 4,000 missiles. This was cut back to 1,000 missiles, which was selected as the smallest number Secretary McNamara felt he could get through Congress and get the Air Force to accept. The Polaris program also was cut back somewhat.

Also, beginning in 1964, the United States shut down 10 nuclear weapons material production reactors, explicitly to limit the availability of critical nuclear material, and in that manner, place a ceiling on the future size to which the U.S. nuclear stockpile could expand. At about the same time, the new B-70 strategic bomber that was to have succeeded the B-52 was canceled. And finally, weapon system design efforts having first strike capabilities, for example high yield and high accuracy, were discouraged, along with ABM development efforts.

In addition to these "strategic" actions, there also was a strong effort to "put the theater nuclear genie back in the bottle." Immediately following President Kennedy's inauguration, the NATO policy review group was formed to review and revise U.S. theater nuclear policy. The thrust of the new policy, officially adopted in late April 1961, was to shift NATO strategy and capability from nuclear to conventional defense. The implementing actions had significant impact on personnel, deployments, posture, plans, technical assistance to allies, and especially on the development of new tactical and theater nuclear systems, all of which were canceled.

During this same period of time, the 1960's, the Soviets deployed their first significant array of strategic nuclear systems. This deployment was well underway in 1964. It was sufficiently massive that Secretary Clifford in his last speech as Secretary of Defense in January 1969, warned that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in strategic nuclear capability later that year. This change in the balance was also reflected in President Nixon's shift from having strategic superiority as an objective, one that he campaigned for in 1968, to a "sufficiency" objective in March 1969.

The U.S. policy in the 1960's of letting the Soviets catchup and attain strategic parity had been achieved by 1969. Additional expansion of Soviet theater nuclear capability followed and later, in the mid to late 1970's both their strategic and theater nuclear capabilities were still further expanded—U.S. unilateral restraint in both areas notwithstanding.

The last significant arms control action in the 1960's, again, a unilateral

U.S. action, came in November 1969 when President Nixon renounced the use of biological weapons and declared that the United States would destroy its stockpile of such agents and weapons. This action was extended in February 1970 to include toxins. Within 2 years, the Soviet Union and the United States, and a variety of other nations, signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which went into effect in March 1975. By that time, the United States had already destroyed all its stocks of biological and toxin agents and weapons, although some minor quantities were later learned to have been retained inadvertently by the CIA. This action was accompanied by parallel unilateral disarming actions by the United States in the chemical warfare area that left the United States essentially unarmed in the chemical area by 1975. The United States now has no offensive biological or toxin capability, essentially no chemical offensive capability, and very weak defenses to use to counteract a Soviet biological or chemical attack.

What few people know is that the 1969 U.S. decision to disarm unilaterally had been preceded by a secret, Soviet invitation for mutual restraint in chemical and biological warfare that was passed to President Nixon via a Soviet double agent. This deceptive invitation was responsible for the President's decision.

However, notwithstanding this Soviet invitation and the U.S. disarming initiatives, beginning in roughly 1972 the Soviets began a major expansion of their chemical, biological, and toxin research, development, production, and testing programs. Then, in the late 1970's the Soviets are believed to have employed and assisted others in employing lethal chemical agents and toxins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in direct violation of both the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Finally, in 1979, it became apparent that the Soviets were continuing to manufacture and store biological warfare agents, also in deliberate violation of the 1972 convention.

The Soviet Union has denied all charges of violations in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Moreover, in retaliation the Soviet Union countercharged that the United States was the source of the contaminants and, further, that we are experimenting with biological warfare in Afghanistan. Further, the Soviet Union has obstructed the United Nations efforts to investigate.

In sum, the United States has been able to do nothing other than raise the issue through a series of demarches and, after those proved ineffective, through public complaints, that have been equally ineffective.

This is the only situation in which the top U.S. leadership have explicitly, unanimously, and publically accused the Soviets of deliberate arms control violations. It is interesting that this

also is the only area where the United States, in entering into the treaty, acknowledged that means of verification were totally inadequate and then discounted the need to verify, perhaps because the United States previously had decided to disarm unilaterally and perhaps because, as stated during the hearings on the treaty, the weapons were not considered strategically significant. This, of course, was misleading because at that time, eminent scientists privately and publically warned that developments in the new field of genetic engineering soon would make biological and toxin weapons very strategically significant.

The major watershed in United States-Soviet nuclear arms control agreements in the 1970's came in May 1972, an election year, when SALT I and the basic principles of relations were signed in Moscow. SALT I had two parts, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The ABM Treaty was to limit each party to two ABM deployment areas, later reduced to one, and to limit ABM technology development. The Interim Agreement was to limit competition in offensive strategic arms for 5 years while further negotiations were conducted. Competition was to be limited by placing a ceiling on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and by limiting conversion of light launchers into launchers for modern heavy ICBM's. In addition, both sides agreed not to interfere with the national means of technical verification, and not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede verification.

Before examining Soviet and U.S. actions covered by these two agreements over the ensuing years, it is useful first to consider the third agreement, the Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations that was signed 3 days after SALT I, but which is usually ignored—it is not even contained in the annual Arms Control Agency's "arms control and disarmament agreement" publication—even though it is explicitly cited in the preamble of subsequent agreements, such as the prevention of nuclear war agreement and SALT II.

In the declaration of basic principles of relations, the United States and the Soviet Union, among other things, agreed to "do their utmost to avoid military confrontation" and to "exercise restraint." The declaration clearly states:

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.

The parties agreed to "continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments."

Furthermore, they agreed "to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs." This certainly lays the basis for valid subsequent concern over diplomatic "linkage."

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Good behavior is explicitly called for in the SALT I Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations. This declaration is very important to consider in deciding how to interpret possible violations or circumventions, as well as other misbehavior of concern.

In interpreting the various Soviet actions as violations or circumventions, two additional important considerations are the significance of the actions and whether they relate to the spirit or letter of the treaty.

If an action is not militarily significant, is it still important? The problem, of course, is the word "significant." To many articulate and influential experts in the arms control area, very little at present is militarily significant because the levels of armaments are so high. Anything over a few hundred weapons is deemed insignificant according to this view.

This view is then directly carried over into verification and specifically into the "adequacy" or "sufficiency" of the verification, where adequacy and sufficiency are determined by one's beliefs concerning "significance." In the minimum deterrence view, verification is really a nonproblem; several thousand warheads more or less is insignificant.

Equally subjective is the question of whether it is the letter or the spirit of the agreement that the signatories should be held accountable for, and in the case of spirit, this would include how unilateral statements should be treated. Some of the most serious problems or disagreements that have arisen have been questions of interpretation, questions of "sharp negotiating practices," and negotiating "deception."

One school of thought is that the spirit of an arms control agreement is a U.S. invention, and something to which the Soviets can not to be held accountable. On the other hand, in most cases, it is clear that the Soviets were aware of the U.S. concerns, knew at the time they would be violated and kept silent or deliberately misled American negotiators. Is this in keeping with the basic principles of relations, specifically the principles of cooperation and no efforts to obtain unilateral advantage?

Either way, from the American point-of-view in evaluating the entire arms control process, what has to be most important is the extent to which our national security interests are being served and safeguarded. If objectives are not met, if the treaty in retrospect is regarded as a bad bargain, then, the entire process is placed at risk.

Therefore, in the following review of United States and Soviet action under SALT I, and later under SALT II, the criteria for evaluation is the combination of military significance, specific treaty terms, and the basic principles of cooperation, mutual restraint, and no efforts to gain unilateral advantage

as agreed to in the 1972 declaration of basic principles of relations.

Following the SALT I agreement, the United States scrupulously complied with all aspects of the ABM and the interim agreement. The main issue raised by the Soviets concerned small environmental covers placed over minuteman silos for weather protection purposes. These were removed following Soviet complaints.

The situation with Soviet actions was not as simple; nor were their reactions to U.S. complaints so responsive. There have been a variety of technical treaty violations by the Soviet Union, including failure to stay within the upper limit on launchers allowed, deployment of ICBM's in disallowed areas, for example, SS-11's at SS-4 sites and operational SS-9's at test ranges, opening a new ABM test range without prior notification, and testing three air defense systems—both radars and missiles—in an ABM mode.

Most of these technical violations do not appear to be of any immediate significance, although some people might question the illegal basing of SS-9 and SS-11 missiles and the testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode as not only strategically significant, but also as a major threat to stability. Part of the problem in assessing significance in such cases, is that the significance really may not be apparent until a much later time. This is especially true in regard to testing air defense systems in an ABM mode. If the test leads to subsequent models that have a significant capability against ICBM or SLBM warheads, the basis for a nationwide defense is established. And, with the recent tests of the SAM-12 in an ABM mode, this is exactly what appears to have happened.

The SAM-12 is a new mobile air defense system that has been tested in an ABM mode. This system has been tested against IRBM's and MRBM's and has been assessed as effective against perishing and missiles aboard Poseidon and Trident submarines. The SAM-12 is expected to go into production shortly and have an initial operating capability in the mid-1980's. With the SAM-12, the Soviets have a relatively cheap ABM system that can be proliferated. As a replacement for current air defense systems, this suggests the procurement of thousands of discrete point defense systems, which when interconnected may provide an effective nationwide BMD capability. Because it is mobile, it is essentially covert and nontargetable, which is precisely as called for in the classified Soviet general staff literature in the late 1960's.

The seriousness of this Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty is further increased by two additional Soviet actions that, if correctly analyzed, also could be very significant violations. These are the construction of radars with assessed battle management capability at five locations and the apparent development of a rapidly de-

ployable mobile ABM. Together, they also could provide a second base for a nationwide ABM capability.

These combined developments mean the Soviets should be expected to have a two-layered nationwide BMD capability coming into existence within 5 years. And, as the Soviets themselves have stated, the development of a nationwide ABM capability would be a most strategically significant development, one that would have major impact on the balance of power. In the just released bipartisan Scowcroft Commission report on strategic programs, there are three references to the Soviet capability to now breakout of the ABM Treaty.

The most significant Soviet violation or circumvention, labeled a "sharp practice" by Henry Kissinger, was the Soviet deployment of their new SS-19 missile, clearly a heavy missile as defined by SALT I, as a replacement for the light SS-11 missile. This has been acknowledged as significant by numerous top U.S. officials, as clearly outside the spirit of the agreement, and, as revealed in reports from sensitive intelligence sources, to have been known and considered by the Soviet officials during the negotiations—specifically in stonewalling U.S. efforts to define "light" and "heavy" and in not responding to U.S. unilateral statements. Indeed, Soviet statements actively misled the United States about the SS-19.

Through this action more than any other, the Soviet Union achieved substantial unilateral advantage in offensive strategic nuclear capabilities during the 1970's. It is hard to view this action as in any sense being consistent with the basic principles of relations or with U.S. arms control objectives.

The final Soviet indiscretion during the SALT I Agreement, was a steady increase in the use of deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception designed to interfere with our national technical means of verification. The known measures employed include camouflage of ICBM testing, production, and deployment; concealment of ballistic missile submarine construction and berthing, including the famous "rubber submarine"; and the encryption of missile telemetry.

Because the treaty forbids new concealment and deception practices, not continuation-of-old practices, one can argue that all the preceding examples were merely continuation of prior practices and do not constitute violations. One also can argue that the preceding examples were not violations because national technical means are not defined and because the Soviet Union still considers U.S. satellite surveillance as illegal spying.

However, there is no question about what the United States meant during the negotiations, and the importance the United States places on verifiability. Consequently, it is difficult to

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label these Soviet actions as anything other than significant violations of the basic principles of relations and of SALT I, particularly because they gradually and increasingly have been expanded over the ensuing years, a Soviet practice that will be discussed further under SALT II.

The second major nuclear arms control agreement of the 1970's was the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which limited underground nuclear tests to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons. Since the treaty yield limit went into effect in 1976, the Soviets are reported to have conducted over 15 tests in excess of the 150-kiloton threshold. In two reported cases, even the lower uncertainty bound on the yield calculation was in excess of 150 kilotons, with one reported to have been 400 kilotons, grossly in excess of the prescribed limit.

The United States has repeatedly complained, but to no avail. The Soviets continue to maintain that there have been no violations; and, the Soviets turned down the U.S. proposal to allow on site inspection at each others test sites to help resolve the compliance disagreement.

The last event of the 1970's was SALT II. Negotiations began in November 1972, and ended with the signing of the agreement in Vienna on June 18, 1979. The principal U.S. objectives were to correct the launcher number inequalities registered in SALT I, establish equal limits on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, begin to reduce those numbers, and restrain further qualitative developments that might threaten future stability.

SALT II negotiations encountered numerous difficulties in trying to deal with different forces, systems, and concepts. Trying to corral the entire panoply of Soviet delivery vehicles, and do so in a manner that was verifiable, perhaps was the treaty's undoing. And when SALT II was presented to the Senate for its advice and consent, it quickly became apparent that the treaty was in trouble.

Before considering the U.S. and Soviet actions under SALT II, it is worth reviewing the main reasons why the Senate and the public would not support the treaty, which then caused the President to defer its active consideration. First, the treaty was simply too complex, and exactly those factors that made the treaty complex were such that a party not wanting to be constrained by the treaty, was not. The loopholes were said to be sufficiently large to drive a Mack truck through. This was judged especially important to those who opposed the treaty because of the actions by the Soviet Union that were clearly outside the spirit of SALT I, such as SS-19 deployment, SAM testing in ABM modes, and increased use of concealment and deception measures.

The consensus was that SALT I had been to the disadvantage of the United

States, and that SALT II put no significant constraints on the Soviets and was even more disadvantageous to America.

The feeling of inequality, which was made a major public issue by the committee on the present danger, was heightened by a growing concern over the general misbehavior of the Soviet Union.

By 1979, it was clear that SALT I did not stop the buildup in Soviet nuclear capability. This buildup took on an especially ominous character with the deployment of the SS-18 and SS-19 missiles and the newly revised assessments of Soviet missile accuracy, both of which raised concerns of Soviet first strike intentions and potential.

It was also clear that détente, SALT I, and SALT II had not resulted in improved U.S.-Soviet relations or in a more peaceful, secure world. Soviet instigation and active support of revolutionary movements in Third World areas and sabotage of U.S. relations with those countries, had taken on a new and greatly expanded dimension in the 1970's. The declaration of basic principles of relations notwithstanding, there certainly was no diplomatic "linkage" in the Soviet mind, or at least not the type the United States had expected to be associated with détente and continued arms control negotiation, as spelled out in the declaration.

The three events that sealed the fate of SALT II, at least up to the present, were first, the revealing in July and August 1979, of the presence of a combat brigade in Cuba; second, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979; and 2 months later, the revealing of a large scale anthrax accident that had taken place at Sverdlovsk the previous April and that indicated that the Soviets were actively violating the biological and toxin weapons convention that had taken effect only 4 years earlier. And, woven in amongst these "indiscretions," was the emergence of evidence that strongly suggested that the Soviets were violating or circumventing SALT I in the variety of ways mentioned earlier.

All the above, coupled with the problems of the SALT II treaty language itself, caused the administration and the proposed treaty to lose credibility.

SALT II, although not officially withdrawn from Senate consideration, was set aside and the treaty has yet to be ratified. Consequently, there is considerable question of how to view Soviet and U.S. actions following signing of the treaty. Are violations challengeable or not?

At times, there have been questions whether either the Soviet Union or the United States felt bound by the treaty. The U.S. policy is not to undercut SALT II as long as the Soviets show equal restraint. The Soviets are not known to have made a high-level commitment to observe SALT II, but have informally indicated they have

been complying with the terms of the treaty.

Rather than get lost in the legal morass, or likewise in the technicalities of the treaty itself, it seems more useful to examine subsequent actions as indications of intentions and for the lessons that possibly can be drawn.

The United States has clearly complied with all aspects of the SALT II treaty. Internal DOD directives address all the terms and insure that developers and planners understand that they are as constrained by the terms of SALT II as much as they would be had it been ratified. Numerous specific actions regarding deployed weapon systems have been taken that further reflect this adherence.

With the Soviet actions, again, several major concerns have arisen. The actions of greatest concern have been rapid reload and refire exercises of the SS-18 missile; concealed deployment of banned mobile SS-16 missiles at the Plesetsk Test Range; deployment of long range air-to-surface cruise missiles on TU-95 Bear Intercontinental bombers and on Backfire bombers, which greatly increases their intercontinental attack capability; almost total encryption of the telemetry associated with the testing of all significant missiles; development of two new types of ICBM's; testing of a new mobile air defense system, SAM-12, in an ABM mode; further increased strategic camouflage, concealment, and deception designed to interfere with the U.S. national means of technical verification; and finally, evidence of direct attack on one of the U.S. national technical means with blinding laser radiation.

The implications of this panoply of Soviet indiscretions are quite simple: Verification of Soviet compliance is now an obvious major problem for the United States. More and more, it appears that the arms control process has had little effect on Soviet nuclear weapons programs, and the declaration of basic principles of relations is clearly ineffective and inoperative.

Verification is a major problem for two main reasons. First, the telemetry encryption prevents accurate assessments of Soviet missile capabilities, such as range and payload. In terms of capabilities, this is significant.

For example, Soviet telemetry encryption prevents assessment of critical SS-20 parameters. We cannot assess whether the SS-20, whose deployment continues, has an intercontinental capability. There is considerable disagreement over the SS-20 range—it could be greater than the 5,000-km range that is most often associated with it. A mere 10-percent increase would put the SS-20 into the SALT II ICBM category. The missile range clearly becomes intercontinental if the payload is reduced to one warhead. And, in this regard, it is important to recall that each of the three warheads said to make up the current SS-20 payload is larger than most

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Minuteman warheads. It is also an intercontinental missile if it is deployed northward into the Kola Peninsula or Kamchatka area, from which the missile can reach most of the United States.

The SS-20, with either 1, 2, or 3 warheads, could be an excellent land-based strategic reserve, and also could play a major role in a Soviet surprise first strike because of its ability to launch out of unexpected areas, thus confusing the defense satellite warning system. Moreover, there is no target base in Europe that comes even close to justifying the system, both in terms of quantity and quality.

The second problem of verification is the result of mobile missiles, the SS-16, SS-20, and perhaps the most recent PL-5, which is described as an intercontinental mobile missile follow-on to the SS-20 or SS-16. Since the early 1960's, the Soviets have stressed the need for mobile missiles for survivability. Because of their ability to change location and their relative ease of concealment and camouflage, survivability is achieved because the enemy cannot effectively find and target the missiles.

This makes verification a serious problem in two ways: First, the missiles are almost impossible to find and, hence, to verify. Verification of production probably is even harder. Second, they bring into question the SALT I practice whereby counting silos was considered tantamount to counting launchers, and that, in turn, to counting missiles. In this latter sense, mobile missiles do not make verification more difficult, they only make non-silo-based missiles more difficult to ignore. Now, to verify the number of strategic offensive missiles, it becomes necessary to recognize and account for the thousands of extra missiles known to exist but not contained in the silos. Further, it will be difficult to estimate with credibility quantities of mobile missiles merely by counting buildings within which they are "believed" to be stored.

The two new Soviet ICBM's PL-4 and PL-5, are also significant in that they further support the argument that the arms control process has not had any appreciable effect on the Soviet arms development process or schedule. The Soviet system continues to turn out new and improved capabilities, contrary to U.S. expectations for the strategic arms limitation process.

Nor are the Soviet developments the result of a "mindless momentum," often attributed to the Soviet system. The capabilities that emerge are well designed and carefully planned to support Soviet military doctrine in an efficient and coherent manner. About the only thing they do not fit is the U.S. mirror image doctrine often attributed to them.

In addition to the above actions that can be considered as challenging, if not conflicting with the terms of the SALT II treaty, all the Soviet actions

in areas that contributed to the deferral of the treaty from active Senate consideration in 1980 have continued through 1983 and, in most cases, have become all the more alarming. In the case of Cuba, nuclear capable aircraft (Mig-23's and TU-95 Bear bombers) are now based and being staged through the island. Nuclear submarines of the Golf and Echo class have been identified at the Cienfuegos Sub Base.

The Soviet war against Afghanistan continues. The use of toxin and lethal chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan has been intensified. Most recently, there has been the Soviet invasion threat and imposition of martial law in Poland and associated restrictions in individual freedoms, which is only one of a continuing succession of blatant violations by the Soviet Union of the Helsinki Agreement.

Finally, there is the ominous cloud of suspicion associated with the possible Soviet involvement in the attempted assassination of the Pope.

Looking back over the past 25-year history of arms control, the U.S. objectives for the most part have been honest and sincere. The best encapsulation of the U.S. objective has been, as best expressed by President Kennedy, to "put the nuclear genie back in the bottle."

At the same time, in assessing the Soviet objectives, it is becoming increasingly difficult not to give considerable credence to the conclusions from a 1973 British intelligence report on a meeting of high level East European officials at which the Soviet General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, explained that détente was really a ruse designed to better enable the Soviets to gain overall military superiority. This report was suppressed by high U.S. officials at the time because it ran counter to U.S. détente policy.

Last month, Henry Kissinger, in a time magazine article, wrote,

If the Soviets refuse to discuss such a proposal (his new approach to arms control), one of three conclusions is inescapable: (A) Their arms program aims for strategic superiority, if not by design, then by momentum; (B) they believe strategic edges can be translated into political advantages; (C) arms control to the Soviets is an aspect of political warfare whose aim is not reciprocal stability but unilateral advantage.

Mr. President, looking back, it would seem to me that all three of these conclusions already should have been reached.

Having reviewed the somewhat sorry accomplishments of our arms control efforts over the past 25 years, I would like to sum up the lessons we should have learned and then suggest some changes that I would like to see the new Arms Control Director seriously consider.

The principal conclusions are first, the product of the past has been disappointing and therefore changes in expectation or in approach or both are called for, second, rushing to achieve a

treaty by a certain date has been counter-productive, third, there are very few areas where the meaningful mutuality of interest essential for real progress appears to exist, fourth, verification of Soviet compliance is unattainable with current approaches and new approaches need to be identified, and fifth, the arms control process appears to suffer badly from a lack of effective leadership in policy formulation and direction.

In reviewing the accomplishments of the arms control process, it is hard to conclude that it has served United States national security interests well. The process has not contributed to stability or to better United States-Soviet relations. It has not resulted in any change in Soviet international behavior. It has not had any significant effect on Soviet weapon acquisition policy.

On the other hand, the process has been accompanied by a substantial decline in relative U.S. military strength—the result of simultaneous U.S. restraint in the face of continuing Soviet expansion.

This does not mean that arms control efforts should cease. The dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear war are too severe not to continue a major arms control effort. The above conclusion only means that the product of the past has been disappointing and that changes in expectations or approach are warranted, if not essential, to achieve meaningful progress.

One serious problem in our approach to arms control has been the rush to achieve results for immediate political payoff. This has been counter-productive. Most serious problems could have been (or were) anticipated during the negotiation processes, but were not resolved in the haste to reach agreement. This was clearly true of the interim agreement and SALT II.

The failure to resolve differences, if anything, has damaged the process because subsequent actions that were considered "at odds with the spirit of the treaty," in retrospect were directly related to the negotiating problems. This, in turn, resulted in attacks of "sharp practices" and "negotiating deception," which have the effect of discrediting the entire process.

That is, the problem in the approach is not just that the Soviets cheat, but also that the United States sacrifices care and assumes unnecessary risks to its security in the name of progress—progress that has turned out to be illusory and contrary to U.S. national security interests.

And, this problem of reconciling differences during negotiations should be expected to grow more severe. The sheer complexity of SALT-II and the problems in start are worse—indicates that unless both sides share roughly mutual interests and intentions, it may be quite difficult to negotiate a safe and equitable agreement on a reasonably encompassing or comprehen-

sive treaty. This may be especially serious because both sides do not appear to share many mutual interests or intentions.

In fact, there appears to be very little mutuality in United States and Soviet foreign policy and arms control interests or objectives. In assessing interests or intent, it is important to examine actions not words. In examining actions, the results of the process speak for themselves. It is difficult to find much congruence of interests or intent.

Assessing interests or intent is further a problem because of Soviet ideology. In particular, the meanings they assign to words, is alien to most Americans. Words such as "peace," "peaceful coexistence," "defense," "noninterference," simply do not have meanings in American dictionaries that are in any sense similar to their Soviet counterparts. The failure of many U.S. negotiators to recognize and understand this is obvious in the very language of many agreements, for example the basic principles of relations and the biological and toxin weapons convention.

Unpleasant as the thought may be, our objective to "put the nuclear genie back in the bottle," may be unrealistic, given the political and ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This is not a call to build arms. It is merely warning that U.S. security interests, including arms control, might be better served by channeling efforts into areas where there might be some prospect for meaningful agreement, rather than continuing to try to negotiate nuclear weapons out of existence. The results of the arms control process over the past 25 years suggests that the weapons are not about to go out of existence. It may even be unrealistic to expect to achieve substantial reductions. These possibilities, albeit unpleasant, need to be faced.

In reviewing the various arms control problems, two areas where there may be common interests are nonproliferation and reducing the risks of accidental war. In regard to the second, there has been a small but growing recognition that instead of focusing almost sole attention on numbers of weapons, we should direct increased attention to the problem of how nuclear war or other wars might start, and look for ways to guard against that event or reduce its likelihood. This is an area that deserves greatly increased attention.

To place verification in the proper perspective, it is essential to recognize that verification is only half of the problem. Enforcing compliance is the other half. Another observation is that there is no way of enforcing compliance against the will of the noncomplying party, which generally will be the case when the noncomplying party is deliberately noncomplying.

Perhaps the more serious complaint levied against the overall approach of

the current administration has been the apparent lack of a definite policy, and of little central direction. The administration is being subjected to pressures from a variety of directions to get moving seriously on arms control, and, except for the President, no one appears able to respond effectively.

Policies appear to be developed mainly to counter pressure from Congress and the media. INF and START, to all outward impressions, are valid examples of this reactive problem. Important issues appear to be left to the inevitable compromises of bureaucratic politics, which produces ample inertia, but little progress. The verification/compliance and chemical/biological/toxins areas are two good examples of this problem.

Verification was not a serious issue in the past, because of the mystique associated with national technical means; because of a widespread belief that, while the Soviets might exploit every loop hole and technicality, they would not deliberately cheat; and because there was no history, that is, no data base or experience, to draw upon.

All these perceptions have changed, and it should be clear that verification has rapidly become the Achilles' heel of arms control. Yet, no one has taken charge, or has been allowed to take charge, of this area, and congressional concern over the types of violations and circumventions previously mentioned is rapidly mounting.

The chemical, biological, and toxin area, as discussed earlier, is the main area where the Soviets have been directly and unequivocally accused by the Reagan administration of deliberate violations. It seems that this should have important implications for the entire arms control process; yet the administration has not established any policy or course of action designed to bring about compliance or deal with the consequences of compliance failure.

As indicated above, the reasons for suggesting new initiatives to improve the arms control process and increase the likelihood of achieving meaningful progress in a desirable direction while simultaneously avoiding the types of disappointments and threats to U.S. security that have resulted from the arms control process over the past two decades.

Clearly, the ongoing INF and START negotiations are well defined and should not be disturbed without major cause. The original objectives set by President Reagan, in INF to eliminate intermediate systems entirely, and in START to reduce strategic nuclear arms to significantly lower and equal levels, certainly appear to be valid and meritorious. There is no reason that the United States cannot continue to strive to achieve these original INF and START objectives, while carefully evaluating possible conceptual improvements or alternative guidelines.

The INF objective, to eliminate intermediate range systems, is good for three reasons: It is a simple concept, noncompliance is probably easiest to identify, and follow-on actions, for example, elimination of short-range missiles, are easy to envision.

But, pressure has already caused the Reagan administration to back off of this "zero base" option, which if successful would result in a treaty that suffers from most of the defects of the past. The current yielding in process, proposing an interim agreement in route to the zero base, is reminiscent of the SALT I interim agreement and should be expected to be equally ineffective. However, while such a treaty would be technically deficient and unverifiable, because most of the pressure is coming from European NATO countries, a bad treaty that NATO decides it wants, at least would not be disharmonious insofar as the alliance is concerned.

The START objective, to reduce the levels of strategic nuclear arms, is good because it recognizes the need to reduce the stockpiles if meaningful accomplishments are to be achieved and especially because as a collateral condition the need for cooperative measures of verification visibly brings out the severe disabilities of the national technical means of verification. However, insofar as there are substantial questions regarding what is to be reduced and what is meant by cooperative measures, START appears headed for serious trouble.

START appears to be headed back into many of the SALT I and SALT II traps—lack of attention to equality, limits that are not limits, an absence of verifiability, and a failure to comprehend the impact on national security—and also SALT I and SALT II, in large measure the result of haste to see results.

Therefore, the best suggestion for START and INF is to recognize the serious inherent difficulties in the process and stop raising false expectations by placing artificial time constraints, such as an INF treaty by the end of 1983 or a START agreement "in time" for the 1984 election. These artificial time constraints are most serious as they apply to START.

In START, the actual nuclear capabilities and intentions of the parties are expected to dominate the process. At the same time, it might be appropriate to review the priorities of negotiating the "systems" terms or verification terms. A major portion of the negotiating effort should address the problems of verification and compliance. Agreement on system definitions, numbers, and deployments will be of little avail without satisfactory means of handling verification and compliance. There is not even agreement on what are national technical means or what constitutes interference, or what camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception is allowed

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and what is not allowed. None of the negotiations have taken the time to resolve these types of critical questions.

In reviewing the potential for flexibility in the "systems" terms of START, achieving substantial reductions in one step along the lines of the START proposal simply may not be in the cards. Further, considering the past, negotiating substantial reductions in one step easily could be considered too risky.

An alternative approach to consider is a longer term approach composed of a sequence of discrete and well-spaced smaller, less substantial steps. This approach would enable the parties in between steps to assess the other side's intentions and behavior at minimal risk.

One guideline might be to not agree to any restraints that the United States is not willing to undertake unilaterally; that is, agree to no restraints that would be judged to be detrimental to United States national security interests, assuming the Soviet Union does not undertake similar restraints. In this approach, the future prospects become based on satisfaction with past performance rather than on speculation about Soviet behavior or intentions or on the politics of achieving substantial immediate results.

This same approach might help ease the verification and compliance problem. That is, it may be more sensible to seek agreements where verification and compliance are used to judge the possibility of moving forward as much as to assess the past.

A related worthwhile, if not essential, effort is to make verification and compliance a two-way street. This problem is presently only a U.S. problem. The Soviets have no problem. A major effort of the verification activities should be to shift the verification burden off the back of the United States national technical means and onto the back of Soviet secrecy and deception where it belongs. There are many actions available to support such a conceptual shift, but few if any have been undertaken or even examined. There has not even been a comprehensive study of Soviet secrecy, cover, and deception practices. Considering the problems of SALT I and SALT II and the inherent importance of verification, which can be viewed as the art of penetrating Soviet secrecy, cover, and deception, such a study would seem to be of the highest priority.

As a general recommendation, there is a strong need to develop a full awareness of the past. In Western bureaucracies, there is a strong tendency to forget the past, that is, to look forward, not back; do not cry over spilt milk. This tendency is especially strong in the United States. However, unless the mistakes of the past are surfaced and understood, they are bound to be repeated. This is exactly what happened in SALT II and it is beginning to happen in START. We cannot make informed decisions on

changes unless the past is understood and corrected.

The need for a critical and continuing review of the past in the process of managing the present and formulating future plans and priorities cannot be overestimated. This is especially applicable to violations and circumventions. The U.S. practice of continuing to forget the past in order to move forward does not enable true forward movement, and quite likely signals Moscow that the United States is really not serious about the need for bilateral arms control.

Does it make sense for the United States or any other nation to continue to talk about a new chemical warfare treaty at Geneva when the 1925 Geneva protocol and 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are being actively violated by the Soviet Union and its allies or when these treaties are even suspected of being violated? How can START or INF move forward with credibility when SALT I and SALT II have been violated, or are suspected of being violated? How can one plan to reduce the allowed nuclear test threshold when the current threshold is being exceeded?

As a matter of priority, compliance and enforcement issues deserve critical high-level attention. The tendency to forgive and forget the evidence, look for reasons to excuse or downplay the issues, change the measure (the "shrinking ruler"), and counter efforts to raise the issues by admonishing the "wolf-criers" that their rhetoric is "anti-Soviet" and counterproductive, have not worked and should be discarded.

A new approach is called for. It should not just look forward. The future is critically dependent on the past. It is crucial to begin by reconstructing the past and resolve all past issues with satisfaction while dealing with the present and future.

The Swedish diplomatic effort, supported and encouraged by the United States, to reconvene the BW/CW States Parties Convention to address future compliance rather than the 1976-83 violations and inspection problems is a good example of evading the real problem and, in effect, assisting the Soviet cause by rendering ineffective exactly that mechanism that should be used to deal with the problem.

A case file on each incident—both violations and circumventions—should be opened. Circumventions should be treated as violations under the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations Agreement. This file should be kept open for 20 years or until the incident is resolved. Incidents can take a long time to develop sufficiently for the total significance to be understood and assessed. Two good examples of this are SAM testing in ABM modes and missile test telemetry encryption. In both cases, the significance of mid-1970's violations did not really get widespread appreciation until 1983.

Each incident should be examined from both a pro and con perspective. Because the natural tendency of the bureaucracy is to want to find compliance and not raise problems, an externally constituted "Red Team" should be used in this evaluation. This team should contain expertise in areas of United States military strategy, Soviet political and military strategy, technology, intelligence, and especially Communist ideology.

The Red Team should review all relevant original source data, identify specific additional data to collect or search for, and determine when nothing is really wrong or when the evidence is such that the burden of proof, insofar as the United States is concerned, has shifted to the Soviets to show they are complying. In the latter case, the Red Team should be used to help develop a specific strategy for the United States to implement to gain compliance or, alternatively, advise the President whether or not the United States should withdraw from the treaty.

As indicated earlier, the two areas where United States and Soviet interests appear to be most aligned are non-proliferation and reducing the risk of accidental war. Efforts in these two areas, especially the latter, could be significantly expanded. The accidental war problem could well be the most important area for arms control research and analysis. The problem will not be easy because it is so closely related to the surprise attack problem, and requires a detailed understanding of Soviet concepts and practices. Soviet surprise attack scenarios in use in the West are unimaginative, do not reflect Soviet thinking as expressed in their literature, or the importance accorded the topic in their doctrine and in their strategic capabilities. A great deal of research and analysis is essential in this area before concrete proposals are formulated or proposed for bilateral discussion. This work also should begin as soon as possible.

The need to examine how war might start, rather than continuing to focus on numbers, recognizes that numbers are a very limited part of capability and can be misleading. This is not meant to say that numbers are unimportant and should be ignored, but rather, that when exclusively relied upon, lead to overly simplistic analysis.

Nuclear capability is as much determined by factors that can not be quantified in a simple manner. Command and control, leadership, morale, and strategy are just as important determinants of capability as are the number of warheads or throw weight. The problem is not just weapons, but war. SALT I and SALT II begin with a recognition of the devastating consequences nuclear war would have for all mankind. The hope then expressed is that the treaty will reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

Increased analysis of the nature of such war and how it might come about is worth far more attention, both to identify measures that might more directly reduce the risk and to better understand what systems and system variables—that is, what numbers—are significant.

Another general suggestion is to use the red team to provide devil's advocate analyses of all potential treaties. This could be an integral part of all negotiations, which should not be terminated until all uncertainties have been resolved and all unilateral statements have been responded to.

President Reagan came to Washington believing that the arms control process was failing and that new approaches were required. The seemingly interminable personnel staffing delays at the Arms Control Agency has resulted in a policy planning vacuum, or rather, has ceded control of the process to the very forces responsible for the prior failures. As an example of the slowness of the process, the ACDA assistant director responsible for verification was not confirmed until last month, and still no one responsible for strategic and theater nuclear matters has even been nominated.

The resultant vacuum has helped make the administration vulnerable to pressures that, for all practical purposes, are forcing the process directly into the mold of the past—pressures to lower U.S. objectives, ignore the problems of the past, not upset the Soviets, and reach an agreement soon.

The apparent objective of turning President Reagan into a "peace candidate," while well intentioned, appears to discount dangerously the past and, in the process, run an unnecessary risk of leading him and the arms control process directly into an election year "buzz saw" not entirely dissimilar to what President Carter experienced with Salt II.

The alternative is obvious. As a matter of urgency, arms control should be accorded the high and serious management priority it deserves. People and policies are needed to provide reasonable direction and response to the serious political and public pressures. The bureaucracy is in dire need of a focus, and, as I stressed at the beginning, one that is mindful of the past and realistic about the future.

Mr. President, I believe the best course of action now, and one that should not be put off any longer, is to bring in someone new, someone with drive and ideas, with sensitivity to the ongoing process, but someone who is not wedded to the past, who is free to consider new ideas from the outside.

Dr. Adelman is exactly that type of professional. His background makes him eminently well qualified. He will be a Director whom I believe will bring new ideas into the arms control process and set about to achieve real progress.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been floundering for half a year, some would say much longer. The Senate should end that problem now by confirming Dr. Adelman.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. TSONGAS) 2 minutes.

Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. President, I should like to read from a letter that was inserted into the RECORD by Senator SPECTER, of Pennsylvania. The letter was sent by him to the President. Let me read part of it.

While Ambassador Adelman is a man of obvious ability and doubtless qualified for most governmental positions, I have grave reservations about his competency for the ACDA post. Next to the Presidency and a few other positions such as Secretary of State or Defense, there is no other post as critical at this moment in our nation's history as Director of ACDA.

I strongly feel that this position could be pivotal on whether arms reduction is achieved and therefore potentially critical on the prevention of a nuclear holocaust. To have anyone in this position other than the very, very best would be a grave mistake.

I could not agree more, Mr. President. I regret that we came out on different sides of the issue.

Let me address, finally, one other point. The issue has been raised that we have to support the nominee and get on with what is happening in Geneva. Nothing is happening in Geneva, because the Soviets believe that they can take Europe away from the United States by using propaganda and the Adelman nomination plays right into their hands. The best thing to do to get progress in Geneva is to have a competent, qualified, credible arms control Director and let us then win over the European hearts and minds and force the Soviets to abandon their political objective, to finally sit down and negotiate. I hope that the Senators, those who are wavering, would call a European of your choice and ask them how they feel about this nominee.

I thank the Senator from Rhode Island.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague (Mr. WEICKER).

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I have pondered the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to direct the U.S. Arms Control Agency for many weeks now. Arms control is without doubt one of the paramount issues of our time and its pursuit is one of the most important responsibilities of this or any government.

Amid the controversy over Mr. Adelman's qualifications for the job, one central truth has become ever clearer to me. That is that if President Reagan is truly committed to an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, then we will have one. If he is not, such an agreement will never materialize, no matter who is in charge of the Arms Control Agency. In the final

analysis, the responsibility for forging and executing our arms control policy lies not with an arms control ambassador but with the President of the United States.

The evidence to date seems to indicate that this administration lacks the commitment necessary to achieve a sound and timely arms control agreement, but that judgment is still only a partial one, the final verdict cannot be delivered until 1984. At that time, the American people will get to judge for themselves the depth and sincerity of this administration's approach to arms control.

In the meantime, I want this administration to have no excuse for failing to achieve some tangible results. I do not want this administration to be able to excuse its record on the basis that its nominee for this post was rejected and that it had to expend all its energies dredging up another. I do not want this administration to justify the paucity of results on the grounds that the President was not allowed to choose his own person for the job—because I intend to hold this President and this administration accountable on the arms control issue and I expect the American people will too.

Therefore, I do not think it appropriate to turn Mr. Adelman's nomination into a referendum on the Reagan arms control policy. While admitting that policy leaves a lot to be desired, I believe the Congress should give Mr. Adelman a chance to achieve the results that have not been forthcoming from the administration to date. As a result, Mr. President, I shall cast my vote in favor of Kenneth Adelman to become our arms control Ambassador.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I express my deep appreciation to my colleague for his statement.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, after debate on the Senate floor lasting 3 days, Senators will shortly have to decide whether Kenneth L. Adelman is qualified to be the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I urge each of my fellow Senators to vote on the basis of the judgment made on that question. If each Senator does that, Mr. Adelman will surely not be confirmed.

In the course of this debate, I have not heard a single argument which has contradicted the finding of the Committee on Foreign Relations that Mr. Adelman is not qualified to serve as the Director of ACDA.

Mr. President, in winding up the debate, I think we should consider that the committee held three lengthy hearings on the nomination and discussed the issue extensively. After the first two hearings, the committee decided, in a 15-to-2 vote, to delay action for a week to allow the President to reconsider the nomination.